

~~SENSITIVE~~

CIA/SAVA /UUVIND 710206



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 6 February 1971*

**NSA Declassification/Release instructions on File.**


*For the President Only*

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## SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1971

Weekly average for each month




NOVEMBER 1970 - FEBRUARY 1971

Weekly data as reported


US BATTLE DEATHS

dropped from last week's 28 to 24 -- the lowest total since the end of October.




SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

climbed sharply from the 144 of last week to 321 -- the highest number since July 1970 -- reflecting increased activity in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.




INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE

remain at a low level with only two special purpose groups detected with a combined strength of 311. The total number of infiltrators since 1 October 1970 is now an estimated 40,700 - 43,100.




ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

increased slightly to 498 from last week's 472.




ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION

jumped to 1,770 after last week's lull when only 776 were reported killed.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces rose to 87% from the 76% of last week.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

Enemy-initiated activity flared a bit early in the week in South Vietnam's Military Regions 1 and 2, but it remained at a fairly low level in the rest of South Vietnam. Available evidence suggests that during the coming week the Communists will continue their harassing attacks, particularly in the northern portions of South Vietnam, in an attempt to divert ARVN forces from the latter's cross-border and pacification operations.

Military activity in Cambodia was generally light during the week, but heavy fighting developed in the Chup Plantation area over the weekend as South Vietnamese forces commenced a large-scale clearing operation. On 7 February, another truck convoy enroute to Phnom Penh from Kompong Som was ambushed on Route 4, but the convoy proceeded on to the capital without further incident after sustaining minor losses. The government is attempting to improve Phnom Penh's defenses by a reorganization of command responsibilities, the establishment of new operational security boundaries, and an improvement of intelligence collection mechanisms (e.g., augmented informant nets). Lon Nol also ordered the construction of a well-fortified dike around the city's main defense perimeter. These measures should crimp Communist capabilities to mount harassing attacks and acts of sabotage and terrorism, but probably will not prevent the enemy from engaging in some continuing harassment.

In north Laos, the royal capital at Luang Prabang is again being harassed in at least a psychologically menacing fashion, but the area of greatest immediate concern remains southwest of the Plain of Jars. There the enemy seems about to launch a major offensive against Vang Pao's forces and their Long Tieng headquarters. The Communists continue their buildup in the area and ground contacts are increasing along the Sam Thong-Long Tieng defensive crescent. In the Panhandle, government troops have reached Muong Phalane, lost to the enemy on 26 January. To the southeast, Operation SILVER BUCKLE interdiction teams, which have been operating along Route 99, are withdrawing to helicopter evacuation sites. On the Bolovens Plateau, enemy units are maintaining pressure on the remaining friendly sites, while government irregulars continue to operate on the northern approaches to the Plateau.

Enemy Infiltration

The lull in detections of infiltration starts in North Vietnam continues, though two special purpose groups were detected in the Laos Panhandle with a combined strength of 311 personnel. This brings the total number of infiltrators spotted since 1 October 1970 to an estimated 40,700 - 43,100. No data has been received concerning the possible 10 "gap groups" mentioned last week, but, if they are indeed in the system, at least some of the "missed" groups should be detected as they transit the Laos Panhandle. A flurry of intercepted messages during the week indicates the enemy is trying to keep up the momentum in his "crash program" of moving supplies south.

South Vietnam Developments

25X1C

"Big" Minh's prospects for the presidency improved over the week-end as a result of An Quang Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang's decision to support him. [REDACTED] he had made his decision following a meeting with Minh on 4 February which convinced him that Minh, while taking any opportunities for peace, will pursue the war with vigor, if necessary, and is even more opposed to a coalition government than Thieu. Quang said he was also persuaded by his belief that Minh would be more effective in removing the bases of popular discontent, and that his election would undermine the Communist propaganda position. Meanwhile, former Senator Tran Van Don reports that Minh has become increasingly convinced that he can defeat Thieu for the presidency. One factor in this confidence is his favorable financial position -- Don says Minh has on hand or promised to him about 200 million piasters (U.S. \$1.7 million) for his campaign, most of which came from Chinese business interests.

Communist Developments

A document captured by ARVN forces presents unusually frank admissions of Communist weaknesses in the area that embraces the nine lower Delta provinces. Dated October 1970, the report was sent by the VC commanding officer of the region to COSVN, and in it he says that about two-thirds of the area's population is living under GVN control -- a figure that nearly corresponds to our HES estimate. The document also states that there are only 7,000 guerrilla forces operating in the area, and it admits that there is neither party cadre nor guerrilla presence in about 1,000 populated hamlets in the zone. The report adds that the region's main-force units were finding it difficult to obtain replacements over the past 18 months and gives several specific examples. To alleviate the situation, the VC regional commanding officer requested 2,000 replacement personnel in 1971 and 1,500 during 1972, as well as the shipment of 200 tons of weapons and ammunition per year.

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